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Many developing countries are actively seeking Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) because
it they enjoy the transfer of skills, knowledge, and capital. Multinational corporations
(MNCs) are more likely to invest in countries with lower political risk. Knowing this,
what forms of governance will help a country attract FDI by lowering its political risk?
Will being a democracy help; will being federal help? This study attempts to add to
inconclusive existing literature on this topic. It utilizes the governance classifications of
71 countries made by Dr. Robert Inman’s in his paper “Federalism’s Values and the
Value of Federalism”. Countries are classified as one of the following: constitutionally
based federal democracy, an administratively based federal democracy, a unitary
democracy, a federal dictatorship, or a unitary dictatorship. Then it studies the impact of
the governance structures on the total investment in a country, the FDI inflows as a
percentage of GDP, the net FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP, and the FDI inflows per
capita in $US. The conclusions are as follows: 1) Democracy is the most importance
governance factor in attracting greater FDI. 2) Federalism does not improve upon
democracy in attracting more FDI. 3) Federalism does not help nondemocratic countries
attract FDI. 4) Federalism is still important because it impacts economic rights, which in
turn help attract greater FDI.
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Introduction
Academics in a variety of disciplines proclaim numerous benefits to adopting a
federal form of governance. Two sets of literature examine the importance of federalism;
one group provides a theoretical framework for understanding the potential positive
impacts of federalism and the other attempts to empirically study the relationships
between federalism and proposed beneficial outcomes. “Federalism’s Values and the
Value of Federalism” by Dr. Robert P. Inman, the advisor to this project, served as a
starting point for understanding the empirical relationships between federalism and a
number of beneficial outcomes that theory claims should exist. In particular, that study
examined whether or not “federalism [serves] as a means to more efficient public and
private economies, as the foundation for increased political participation and democratic
stability and as an important check on governmental abuses of personal rights and
liberties.”1 The results of the study will be discussed later in its relationship to this
project. As this broad study indicates, academics often claim that federalism improves the
performance of economies. This paper takes a much narrower approach towards
understanding this relationship, and attempts to understand whether or not federalism
contributes to increased amounts of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).
Why should it be useful to understand the relationship between the form of
governance and FDI? One answer would be that FDI is an essential factor for economic
growth. This however is not a trivial claim because “[t]he role of foreign direct
investment (FDI) in the growth process has long been a topic of intense debate.”2

1

Inman, Robert. (2007) “Federalism’s Values and the Value of Federalism”, CESifo Economic Studies 53,
522-560.
2
Balasubramanyam, V.N., Salisu, M. & Sapsford, D. (1996) “Foreign Direct Investment and Growth in EP
and IS Countries”, Economic Journal 106(1), 92-105.
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Nonetheless, there exists both theoretical and empirical research that argues the position
that once a country attracts FDI, it experiences increased efficiency and growth. Despite
the lack of resolution to this question, an empirical analysis of the relationship between
federalism and FDI can serve useful since “many less developed countries (LDCs) have
been actively seeking FDI inflows since the early 1980s, based on the belief that FDI can
bring several benefits, including technology transfers, managerial skills and access to
international markets.”3 Presumably, these countries will continue to seek FDI due to
their assumptions about its benefits. Understanding how they can best achieve their
desired results seems to be a reasonably useful exercise.

Theoretical Literature
In his paper “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving
Federalism and Economic Development”, Barry Weingast provides much of the
theoretical arguments for the hypothesis of this project. It examines the idea that
historically, federalism played a critical role in the growth of numerous countries,
including “England in the 18th century and the United States in the 19th and 20th centuries
… [and also] China over the past 15 years.”4 The arguments he utilizes to justify his
claims are worth exploring because the same theoretical arguments can help to justify the
hypothesis made and to ultimately explore the meaning of the empirical results herein
contained.
The first step is to understand what Weingast defines as “Market-Preserving
Federalism”. This paper attempts to contribute something to the understanding of this
3

Yang, Benhua. (2007) “Autocracy, Democracy, and FDI Inflows to the Developing Countries”,
International Economic Journal 21(3), 419-439.
4
Weingast, Barry. (1995) “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and
Economic Development”, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 11(1), 1-31.
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classification also, as an aside to the primary hypothesis; this will be discussed later.
Weingast establishes five criteria that classify a governance structure as marketpreserving federalism. They are the following:
(F1) A hierarchy of governments, that is, at least “two levels of governments rule
the same land and people,” each with a delineated scope of authority so that each
level of government is autonomous on its own, well-defined sphere of political
authority.
(F2) The autonomy of each government is institutionalized in a manner that
makes federalism’s restrictions self-enforcing.
(F3) Subnational governments have primary regulatory responsibility over the
economy.
(F4) A common market is ensured, preventing the lower governments from using
their regulatory authority to erect trade barriers against the goods and services
from other political units.
(F5) The lower governments face a hard budget constraint, that is, they have
neither the ability to print money nor access to unlimited credit. 5
Once these conditions are met, a number of consequences follow. Discussions on those
relevant to the hypothesis of this paper follow. The first consequence described by
Weingast is the “induced competition among lower units of the federal structure.”6 In
thinking about this in context of a well known federal government, the United States, one
can consider competition among states, which are lower units of the federal structure.
States have autonomy in deciding numerous issues and thus can vary quite significantly
5

Weingast, Barry. (1995) “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and
Economic Development”, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 11(1), 1-31.
6
Ibid.
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from each other in their legal and political environments. Due to conditions set out from
market-preserving federalism, it follows that “political competition implies that
jurisdictions must compete for capital, labor, and economic activity by offering menus of
public policies (e.g., levels of taxation, security of private rights, social amenities, and
public goods).”7 Those actors that seek to utilize these policies will choose the correct
menu for them.
The application to FDI follows in a relatively straight forward manner. First,
assume that countries actively seek FDI. Although this paper does not focus on this issue,
it cites Yang (2007), who claims that they do. Then assume that if the country as a whole
seeks FDI due to some presupposed benefits, local entities would seek FDI for
themselves to reap the benefits locally. This makes sense if one considers that managerial
skill transfer and technological knowledge transfer are some of the assumed benefits;
jurisdictions that obtain these would be more capable of competing with the other lower
units. One can imagine that a particular set of menu choices regarding economic policies
such as tax rates, operating rules and restrictions, labor laws, etc. would be optimal in
attracting a multi-national corporation (MNC) to invest in that particular lower unit of the
federal structure, whether it is a state or whatever else. Since competition exists, this
menu of options would be more favorable to MNCs than a menu created by one entity,
such as what would occur in a dictatorship for example. Consequently, MNCs would
invest more in those jurisdictions with optimal menu options and therefore in countries
with federal governance structures.
Nathan Jensen, in his paper “Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors:
Federalism, Government Credibility, and Foreign Direct Investment”, provides a separate
7

Ibid.
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analysis that specifically tries to deduce why federalism should induce higher FDI. His
discussion does not require market-preserving federalism; it analyzes the consequences of
the larger set of governance of federalism which requires the (F1) and (F2) of Weingast’s
criteria. The theoretical argument in his work does not rely on the concept of competition
between lower units of governance for FDI. Instead it relies on the assumptions that
MNCs base their decision to invest in particular countries for political reasons as well as
economic ones; in particular, they would logically consider the political risks inherent in
the country that could potentially hurt their bottom line. Jensen’s assumption is that
“political institutions, specifically federal political systems, can lower political risk for
investors by increasing the trustworthiness of government.”8
The analysis of how federal governments can lower political risk relies on the
notion that the different levels of government (i.e. the federal government and the lower
federal units) have veto power over each other on the economic issues that can influence
the decisions of MNCs to invest. Notice that the existence of such veto powers is
consistent with (F2) in Weingast’s definitions of federal governance. Suppose further that
the goal of each political unit is to maximize its wealth. Given these assumptions, we can
begin to understand the concerns that a MNC would have in investing in a particular
country.
The most dramatic manner in which a foreign government can take advantage of
an MNC’s invest is by nationalizing the company once the investment is made. In this
way, the foreign government can “expropriate [the] assets or income streams”9 of the

8

Jensen, Nathan and McGillivray, Fiona. “Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism,
Government Credibility, and Foreign Direct Investment,” International Interactions 31, 303-325.
9
Jensen, Nathan and McGillivray, Fiona. “Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism,
Government Credibility, and Foreign Direct Investment,” International Interactions 31, 303-325.
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MNC. These types of nationalization occurred in the late 1960s and the early 1970s.
Although they are no longer common, other risks that seriously affect the income of
MNCs still exist. In particular, these risks include “defaulting on tax deals, restricting
capital flows, defaulting on subsidies, etc.”10 One can also imagine that dramatic
increases in the tax rate would take some of the income streams of the MNC. These
considerations imply that political risks are real in terms of their impact on MNC incomes
and thus are important factors in determining whether or not a particular foreign
investment is a positive net present value (NPV) project or not. Lower political risk
would make more foreign investments positive NPV projects and thus more investments
will occur.
In order to understand how the actions of federal government and unitary
governments differ regarding whether or not to expropriate income streams from MNCs,
it is necessary to delineate what factors influence their decisions. In order to simplify the
rhetoric, this paper refers to these types of expropriations (i.e. nationalization, defaulting
on tax deals, etc.) as reneging on the “contract” between the government and the MNC to
protect the political policies that induced the MNC to invest in the first place. When
deciding whether or not to renege, the government considers the benefits and the costs.
The benefits are immediate increases in revenue for the government. Since decisions to
invest are made repeatedly, the cost is the resultant reputational damage that will likely
reduce the FDI inflows in the future. Situations in which the immediate benefits outweigh
the long term costs as well as situations in which the long term reputational damage and
decreased FDI inflows are worth more than the immediate revenue streams can both
exist. Presuming rational actors make the decisions, the action with the highest NPV will
10

Ibid.
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be chosen by the government. Although in unitary governments, these decisions can be
based on such an analysis, the idea is that federal structures prevent governments form
choosing to renege even if it is the more rational decision in terms of NPV. If so doing,
federal structures lower the risk that governments will renege regardless of their fiscal
consideration. Thus, federalism instills confidence in the MNCs related to their
assumptions about their income streams and thereby encourages investment.
Jensen and McGillivray amalgamate the existing literature (which includes
Weingast’s work) into a cohesive theory explaining how federalism is more effective
than other governance structure in preventing reneging on contracts.11 Instead of
summarizing their theory and risking losing key elements, the following is a direct quote
of an example from their paper that explains the most relevant ideas.
Consider a foreign investor contemplating investing capital in a factory overseas.
Suppose the foreign investor negotiates a contract to build a factory with a foreign
government… [B]y defecting today, the government foregoes future benefits form
FDI. However, the government wants to stay in power today. It values the shortterm political benefits of defecting over higher long-term levels of FDI. In this
kind of scenario, we expect the government to engage in creeping expropriation
up to the point where the foreign firm is indifferent between remaining in the host
country and relocating its factory elsewhere.
Suppose next that the host country is a federal political system with three
states, A, B, C. Any two of these three state governments can veto the federal
government’s policy proposals. The federal government can veto the policy
initiatives of any individual state government. Legislation relating to FDI requires
the agreement of both the state and federal governments. Both the state and the
federal governments benefit from FDI (via federal and local taxes, local
employment, etc.).
Suppose that the state government reneges on the contract with the foreign
investor by demanding higher local taxes. The state reaps the benefits from
defaulting. For the government, these short-term benefits outweigh the damage to
their reputation and the loss of future FDI. However, reneging damages the
reputation of both the federal and the state government. The federal government
gets none of the short-term political benefits but shares the reputational costs (less
11

Jensen, Nathan and McGillivray, Fiona. “Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism,
Government Credibility, and Foreign Direct Investment,” International Interactions 31, 303-325.
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future investment for the nation). It has an incentive to intervene to prevent the
state government from defaulting. One could argue that since it is the state that
defaults and not the federal government, this will not damage the federal
government’s reputation. However, by not stepping in to prevent the state from
defaulting, the federal government’s reputation is harmed.
Suppose next that the federal government reneges by demanding higher
federal taxes from the foreign investor’s factory, located in state A. If the federal
government reneges on the contract, it reaps all of the benefits. In this case, the
short-term benefits of reneging outweigh the long-term cost in lost future
investment. State A does not share in the short-term benefits; rather its reputation
is damaged because it could not prevent the federal government from defaulting.
Indeed, the reputational costs are shared by all the states. If the federal
government steals in one state, it harms future investment in other states. States
have incentives to cooperate in preventing the federal government from reneging
on FDI contracts. In this way, state governments act as a restraint on the federal
government.
How do these arguments for federal systems compare with the case for
unitary systems? Suppose that a particular country is unitary in structure. FDI
contracts need only the approval of the central government. The central
government reaps all of the benefits from FDI (some of which it distributes to
local governments). The only constraint on the central government is the damage
reneging does to its own reputation. However, as discussed earlier, the immediate
political benefits from reneging often outweigh long-term economic costs. The
pure reputational argument is not as powerful a constraint on the central
government as is the state veto in federal systems, where because of joint
reputation accountability, the federal government is prevented from reneging by a
majority of states.
…
In summary … we should expect federal systems to attract more FDI than unitary
systems.12
Given these strong theoretical arguments, the expectation is that empirically,
federal governments attract higher levels of FDI as a percentage of GDP. However, there
are other arguments within the literature that do not agree with the logic described above.
Thus, there is ambiguity in the theory that needs to be resolved empirically.
In their paper, “Does Federalism Preserve Markets?”, Jonathan Rodden and Susan
Rose-Ackerman argue against Weingast’s theory that market-preserving federalism has
the positive outcomes as described above. Instead, they theorize that the effect can be the
12

Jensen, Nathan and McGillivray, Fiona. “Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism,
Government Credibility, and Foreign Direct Investment,” International Interactions 31, 303-325.
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exact opposite of what Weingast (and Jensen essentially) propose as the consequences of
federalism. In reference to the notion that competition between lower level political units
encourages the creation of the optimal menu of policy choices, they retort that
“intergovernmental competition may not force subnational politicians to make efficient
policies, and in fact the decentralization of authority that is necessary to bring about
competition may introduce significant costs.”13
Their conclusions can be applied to the relationship between federalism and FDI
specifically very naturally. The assumption was that if a particular country, and lower
political units within that country, was seeking FDI inflows, the competition described
would result in the optimal political atmosphere to attract that FDI. If however, the switch
from no policy decentralization to significant policy decentralization (enough to make the
competition viable and effective) has immense costs associated with it, the analysis of the
government when deciding to renege may be very different. Suppose that a country is a
dictatorship and its sole goal is to attract FDI. It knows that changing its governance
structure by introducing policy decentralization will result in increased FDI (assume this
is the result that this study finds). However, the government undergoes tremendous costs
in creating the system that will be necessary. The government will only go through with
the transition if the present value of the increase in FDI is greater than the present value
of the costs that will be incurred. Even if the FDI inflow increase is enormous, it may not
be rational to change governance structures in certain cases. Thus, the theory does not
provide us with an answer here; the costs may vary significantly from country to country.

13

Rodden, Jonathan and Rose-Ackerman, Susan. (1997) “Does Federalism Preserve Markets”, Virginia
Law Review 83, 1521-1572.
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The author contributes one additional theoretical problem with applying Weingast
to this particular study. Although competition may induce the “optimal menu of policies”,
this optimal menu requires compromises on certain goals to achieve other more important
goals. Although countries actively seek FDI, that may not be the highest priority of the
countries nor of the lower political units. The optimal menu may sacrifice the structures
and policies to attract the highest amounts of FDI. Thus, even if Weingast is correct in his
analysis and conclusions, it does not imply that federalist countries necessary have higher
amount so FDI; it certainly does imply that they have the highest capacity to do so
however since if it was the top priority the analysis given previously applies. We assume
in this paper that since FDI has such tremendous exogenous benefits such as technology
transfer and the transfer of managerial knowledge that for most countries it would be a
reasonably high enough priority to warrant attention and therefore, Weingast’s ideas
should be reflected in the data.

Empirical Literature
The question studied by this project has been explored before; the results have
been varied and no decisive conclusion has been reached. In fact, the results are varied
not only regarding federalism’s impact on FDI, but on democracy’s impact on FDI as
well. This study attempts to answer both questions.
Benhua Yang, in his paper “Autocracy, Democracy, and FDI Inflows to the
Developing Countries”, describes the existing literature on these topics in the following
way: From 1983-1992 autocracies seemed to attract the highest levels of FDI and from
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1993-2002 democracies seem to do so.14 He also finds, as does the author of this paper,
that the existing theoretical and empirical literature is insufficient to answer the question
one way or the other. Regarding the relationship between democracy and FDI, he writes
that “some authors (e.g. Li & Resnick, 2003, Jensen, 2003) argue that democracy
promotes FDI inflows by providing better property rights protection, others (O’Donnell,
1978; Haggard, 1990; Greider, 1998) argue that FDI favors autocracy for reasons such as
its capacity to suppress labor demands, repress against protestors, and offer tax incentives
to the advantage of multinational corporations (MNCs).”15 Moreover, he writes that “the
provision of effective property rights protection and contract enforcement by a
democracy will promote FDI inflows (Li & Resnick 2003, Jensen, 2003). Similarly,
Henisz (2000) argues that the higher number of veto players in the democratic system
places constraints on policy changes and hence helps attract FDI.”16
This analysis extends naturally to the argument that federalism promotes FDI
inflows. The theoretical literature supporting why this should be the case relies heavily on
the concepts that argue democracy should promote FDI. In effect, democracy serves a
similar purpose as federalism – as a thought experiment we assume they are mutually
exclusive. Democracy lowers political risk by increasing rights protections and
federalism does the same thing. Thus both should attract higher levels of FDI. However,
as Yang shows, the existing empirical literature does not show this result to be the clear
answer. Yang adds to the discussion by concluding that there is no “systematic

14

Yang, Benhua. (2007) “Autocracy, Democracy, and FDI Inflows to the Developing Countries”,
International Economic Journal 21(3), 419-439.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
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relationship between democracy and FDI inflows. This result suggests that being a
democracy does not help attract higher levels of FDI.”17
Jensen and McGillivray come to exactly the opposite conclusion as Yang. In
particular, they find that “both democratic and federal countries attract higher levels of
FDI. Both institutions help lower political risk. The additive effect of combining
federalism and democracy, however, is small. As we suspected, democratic countries are
already regarded as trustworthy, so the additional credibility provided by federalism has
little effect on FDI. However, federalism has a strong effect on the integrity of
nondemocratic countries. All else equal, federal nondemocratic countries attract some of
the highest levels of FDI.”18
As has been shown through reviewing the existing literature, both the theoretical
and empirical work that has been done has shown opposing results. Thus, looking at the
literature in existence, we cannot come to a conclusion about the effects of democracy or
federalism. Thus, this paper seeks to contribute another study to this body of literature
and hopefully add additional support to one of the conclusions that has already been
reached. It makes improvements on some of the methodology; most notably this occurs in
the classifications of the countries that is taken from Dr. Inman’s work.

Definitions
Foreign Direct Investment
The first important term that requires definition is Foreign Direct Investment, or
FDI. It is important to know that FDI is not the same as portfolio investment, such as that
17

Ibid.
Jensen, Nathan and McGillivray, Fiona. “Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism,
Government Credibility, and Foreign Direct Investment,” International Interactions 31, 303-325.
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make in stocks or bonds abroad. It specifically refers to investment in real operations
(e.g. capital expenditures on fixed assets).19 An even more precise definition defines FDI
to “an investment made to acquire lasting interest in enterprises operating outside of the
economy of the investor.”20 Moreover, “[t]he most important characteristic of FDI, which
distinguishes it from foreign portfolio investment, is that it is undertaken with the
intention of exercising control over an enterprise.”21 The importance then of studying
FDI, versus studying portfolio investment for instance, is that when a multi-national
corporation exercises control over a foreign enterprise it directly transfers managerial and
other business skills to the local employees of that operation. This transfer of information
can have a significant multiplier effect since the employees can apply these skills in other
situations. Thus, these transfers of knowledge and skills eventually can lead to growth for
the country. This combination of capital, tangible knowledge and skills, and direct
creation of jobs is what makes FDI particularly special, and much more coveted than
simple portfolio investment.
As can be deduced by the effects that FDI can have, it is most important for
developing nations as they are the ones that desire the transfers of skills. Thus, given our
theoretical discussions, we must keep in mind that their may be differences on how
actively certain countries seek FDI. If we rely on the explanation that local political units
seek FDI by creating the correct menu of policies, then the notion that countries seek FDI
with different degrees of tenacity (which is based on the development of the country)
throws a kink into that logic. Nonetheless, we have discussed Jensen’s joint argument
which relies both on this notion of competition and reputational arguments. Thus, there
19

Source: World Bank.
Source: World Bank, www.UNCTAD.org
21
Ibid.
20
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exist various theoretical explanations that can fit our model of the world even if we
change the assumptions (e.g. from everyone seeking FDI actively to different degrees of
tenacity in seeking FDI).

Forms of Governance
The precise definition of market-preserving federalism based on Weingast’s work
is provided in the “Theoretical Literature” section. However, the classifications in this
paper are slightly different (Weingast was simply used to provide theoretical context that
is still relevant as many countries we classify as federal fit his definition of marketpreserving federal governments). The classifications of the forms of governance are
based on those classifications used by Dr. Inman in his paper “Federalism’s Values and
the Value of Federalism”. He relies on William Riker’s definition of federalism which is
“(A) political organization in which the activities of government are divided between
regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind of
government has some activities on which it makes final decisions.”22 Essentially, this
requires (F1) and (F2) in Weingast’s definitions and (F3), (F4), and (F5) may or may not
hold true.
One of the improvements that this paper makes on much of the existing literature
is that it utilizes categorical measures for the form of governance (adapted from Dr.
Inman’s work) instead of using a scale of democracy or federalism. Much of the existing
literature tries to rank countries how democratic and how federal they are. This study
does not that; it simply classifies countries into particular categories of governance. In so

22

Inman, Robert. (2007) “Federalism’s Values and the Value of Federalism”, CESifo Economic Studies 53,
522-560.
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doing, it seeks to answer whether or not instituting the basic structures of particular types
of governance types makes a difference in attracting FDI inflows. The following is taken
from Dr. Inman, the advisor to this project:
[The following table, Table 1] classifies each of the 73 countries included in this
study as either a federal democracy (denoted FED/DEM = 1in the empirical
analysis), a unitary democracy without significant policy decentralization called
an administratively federal democracy [ADMFED/DEM = 1] a unitary democracy
without policy decentralization called simply a unitary democracy (UNT/DEM =
1), a federal dictatorship (FED/DICT = 1), or a unitary dictatorship (UNT/DICT =
1).23
See Table on the next page.
The difference between being FEDDEM and ADMFEDDEM is that FEDDEM refers to
constitutionally federal governments where are ADMFEDDEM refers to de facto federal
governments that are determined based on the amount of local government revenue as a
percentage of total government revenue (See Inman (2007) for more details). A federal
dictatorship essentially has some policy decentralization where as a unitary dictatorship
does not.

23

Ibid.
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Table 1

Form of
Governance

Federal/Democracy
(FED/DEM = 1)
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Colombia
Germany
India
Spain
Switzerland
United States
Venezuela
Unitary/Democracy
(UNT/DEM = 1)
Bangladesh
Chile
Ecuador
Greece
Guatemala
Iceland
Ireland
Jamaica
Luxenbourg
Mauritius
New Zealand
Papua New Guinea
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
United Kingdom
Unitary/Dictatorship
(UNT/DICT = 1)
Algeria
Bolivia
Botswana
Bulgaria
Cameroon
China
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Ghana
Honduras
Indonesia
Korea
Myanmar
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Sudan
Thailand
Tunisia
Vietnam
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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Number of
Provinces (N )
N=1 if Unitary

Mean = 20.3

23
7
9
3
27
10
27
16
25
17
26
51
24
Mean = 2.4

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
20
1
1
2
4

Form of
Governance
Administrative
Federal/Democracy
(AFED/DEM = 1)
Denmark
Finland
France
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Uruguay

Federal/
Dictatorship
(FED/DICT = 1)
Comoros
Czechoslovakia
Ethiopia
Malaysia
Mexico
Nigeria
Pakistan
Russia
Tanzania
United Arab Emirates
Yugoslavia

Number of
Provinces (N )
N=1 if Unitary

Mean = 9.6

1
1
1
22
47
11
1
1
1

Mean = 18.6

3
2
10
13
32
37
4
89
2
7
6

Mean = 4.7

1
1
1
1
10
28
1
1
10
1
27
1
7
1
1
1
1
9
1
1
1
1
1
1
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Hypothesis
Based on the theoretical and empirical literature as a whole couple with intuition,
the hypothesis is as follows:
1) Democracy should result in higher levels of FDI because it lowers political
risk.
2) Federalism should result in higher levels of FDI (even on top of democracy)
because it lowers political risk even more and it have the positive outcomes of
competition between lower level political units and a joint-reputational set-up
between the central and local governments.

Empirical Analysis
The analysis studies the impact of the form of governance on four dependent
variables related to FDI. The time period over which these variables are studied is from
1970-1998 and although 73 countries were originally selected for the study as shown
above, ultimately 71 yielded sufficient enough results to be included (Myanmar and
Yugoslavia were excluded). The way in which the dependent variables are treated differs
from the way they are treated in much of the existing literature; the author believes this is
another area in which this study improves upon previous ones. Previous work looks at
each year as a data point and studies the effects over time. This paper looks at the average
of the 1970-1998 time period instead because the author believes an average can more
effectively answer the question at hand. Once a country becomes a democracy or a
institutes enough policy decentralization to be considered federal, the hypothesis assumes
that the FDI should increase. If two countries are federal and FDI for one of them
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increases over time and FDI does not increase for the other, then the increase must be due
to some other factor than its form of governance. Thus, a study that analyses the data on a
yearly basis incorporates changes in FDI caused by other factors.
The four dependent variables are Total Investment (CI7098), FDI inflow as a
percentage of GDP (PCTFDI7098), Net FDI (i.e. FDI inflows – outflows) as a percentage
of GDP (FDINET7098), and FDI inflow per capita (FDIPC7098).
Total investment is a measure taken from the Penn World Tables (PWT) database
version 6.2. The variable is defined as the Investment Share of CGDP, where CGDP is
the Real Gross Domestic Product Per Capita. The number associated with each country
is a percentage. An entry of “10.0” means that total investment (per capita of course) is
10% of CGDP. The purpose of this variable is simply to see of governance impacts
investment overall. This seems to be just as interesting of a question as whether or not it
impacts FDI in particular.
FDI inflow as a percentage of GDP utilizes two sources of data. The FDI inflow
data (in $US) comes from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The GDP is calculated
using data from PWT using the variables CGDP and population. The purpose of studying
FDI as a percentage of GDP instead of the level of FDI is to eliminate the effect of the
size of the economy. Smaller economies will naturally have smaller levels of FDI inflow,
but that does not necessarily mean that they don’t have favorable policies toward FDI. As
a percentage of the size of their economy, FDI may still contribute an enormous amount
of capital. Net FDI as a percentage of GDP essentially does the same thing as
FDIPCT7098, but it looks at the FDI inflows minus the FDI outflows (both from the
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IMF) as a percentage of GDP. Essentially, this variable enables to see whether or not
democracies and federal governments seem to be capital importers and exporters.
FDI inflow per capita just takes the FDI inflow data from the IMF and divides by
the population from PWT. The purpose of this is exactly the same as FDIPCT7098 but it
simply provides a different technique for studying FDI while eliminating the effects of
the size of the market. It simply eliminates the effect of size of the country in a different
way; the expectation is that the results should be very similar given either variable.
The independent variables are the forms of governance taken from Dr. Inman.
They are described in detail in the “Forms of Governance” section in the “Definitions”
section. There are five variables; they are FEDDEM, ADMFEDDEM, UNTDEM,
FEDDICT, and UNTDICT. In the data, a 1 is assigned to the category under which the
country falls and a 0 is assigned to the rest of the variables. In the analysis, when
studying the effect of democracy on our dependent variables, we create an additional
variable called DEM. DEM = FEDDEM + ADMFEDDEM + UNTDEM. Similarly, when
studying the effects of federalism we look at a new variable ALLFEDDEM = FEDDEM
+ ADMFEDDEM.
Later in the paper, in order to make sense of the results that follow, another
independent variable called HJGADP is introduced. This variable is essentially a measure
of economic rights on a scale from 0-1. More formally it is the following:
The Hall-Jones index of government anti-diversion policies, created for the years
1986-1995 as a measure of a government’s enforcement of law and order and
control of corruption (scaled from 0-1, higher score representing policies
supportive of private economic activity). Mean = 0.66 (S.D. = 0.21) Source: Hall
and Jones (1999).24
24

Inman, Robert. (2007) “Federalism’s Values and the Value of Federalism”, CESifo Economic Studies 53,
522-560.
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This is an important variable because of it impacts our dependent variables quite
significantly, and it explains something about federalism’s impact.
In terms of controls, various variables were considered. These include GDP, GDP
per capita, growth rate, trade openness, infrastructure, legal origin, and market based vs.
bank based capital market structures. In the various regressions that were ran and
analyzed different sets of controls were used. Ultimately however, this added levels of
complexity beyond the scope of this paper in terms of many of the theoretical
implications. Thus, the main control that was utilized in performing the analysis whose
resulted are presented here was a variable called ABSLAT, which is the absolute latitude
from the equator. This is an effective control variable because it captures a lot of the
differences in history between countries that have led to their level of economic
development. Dr. Inman writes that ABSLAT “serves as a control for the country’s
location and climate and has proven to be an important fundamental determinant of
economic growth, incomes and a country’s colonial legacies”.25
The following tables give summary statistics for the variables described within
this section. The purpose of these is to get a general sense of the data looks like.
Table 2:
Dependent Variables
Variable
CI7098
PCTFDI7098
FDINET7098
FDIPC7098

Obs
71
71
71
70

Mean

Std. Dev.

18.70
0.62
0.17
62.75

7.83
0.58
0.67
94.68

Min
3.74
0.00
(1.90)
0.00

Max
34.45
2.64
1.99
457.87

This table informs us that on average, total investment in a country is about 18.70% of its
GDP, FDI inflows are about 0.62% of GDP, FDI net inflows are about 0.17% of GDP
25

Ibid.
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(and that on average countries are importers of FDI since a negative number indicates
they are an exporter of FDI), and that FDI per capita is $62.75.
Table 3:
Dependent Variables
Variable
CI7098
PCTFDI7098
FDINET7098
FDIPC7098

Obs

Mean

33
33
33
33

Std. Dev.

15.29
0.41
0.29
12.42

Min

7.95
0.43
0.61
19.77

3.74
0.00
(1.79)
0.00

Max
33.12
1.92
1.99
96.38

This table is the same as before except all of the democracies have been removed (recall
the DEM variable defined previously). It seems that most dependent variables fall (18.70
 15.29, 0.62  0.41, 62.75  12.42). The objective of running the regressions we do is
to see if these reductions are actually statistically significant.
Table 4:
Form of Governance

PCTFDI7098

FDINET7098

FDIPC7098

CI7098

FEDDEM AVG
FEDDEM STDEV

0.84
0.71

0.14
0.64

121.37
126.51

22.26
5.39

UNTDEM AVG
UNTDEM STDEV

0.81
0.67

0.47
0.61

77.95
97.84

17.13
5.96

ADMFEDDEM AVG
ADMFEDDEM STDEV

0.75
0.56

(0.43)
0.63

122.49
110.68

25.90
5.13

FEDDICT AVG
FEDDICT STDEV

0.44
0.60

0.14
0.84

17.41
31.02

15.31
7.69

UNTDICT AVG
UNTDICT STDEV

0.39
0.35

0.35
0.48

10.25
12.60

15.29
8.23

Table 4 shows very simple averages and standard deviations for each dependent variable,
categorized by the independent variables. Since this initial quick and dirty analysis seems
interesting (as we see that Dictatorships have much lower averages than the others), we
expect the regression analysis to tell us a story somewhat consistent with the hypothesis.

Aakash Madhu

Wharton Research Scholars

22

Federalism’s Impact on Foreign Direct Investment Inflows

Empirical Analysis Results
The results of the regressions are provided in the following tables along with
basic interpretations. The “Conclusion” section fits these interpretations in with the
theoretical analysis provided earlier and it attempts to understand the implications of the
results.
See tables 5, 6, and 7 below.
Table 5:

Dependent Variable

Independent Variables

Variable of
Interest (VoI)

Coefficient
of VoI

P > |t|

R-squared

CI7098
PCTFDI7098
FDINET7098
FDIPC7098

ABSLAT DEM
ABSLAT DEM
ABSLAT DEM
ABSLAT DEM

DEM
DEM
DEM
DEM

2.698
0.295
0.013
56.289

0.115
0.048
0.939
0.005

0.372
0.143
0.132
0.422

CI7098
PCTFDI7098
FDINET7098
FDIPC7098

ABSLAT DEM FEDDEM
ABSLAT DEM FEDDEM
ABSLAT DEM FEDDEM
ABSLAT DEM FEDDEM

FEDDEM
FEDDEM
FEDDEM
FEDDEM

1.729
0.081
0.059
28.658

0.427
0.671
0.789
0.259

0.378
0.145
0.133
0.434

CI7098
PCTFDI7098
FDINET7098
FDIPC7098

ABSLAT DEM ALLFEDDEM
ABSLAT DEM ALLFEDDEM
ABSLAT DEM ALLFEDDEM
ABSLAT DEM ALLFEDDEM

ALLFEDDEM
ALLFEDDEM
ALLFEDDEM
ALLFEDDEM

4.665
(0.082)
(0.471)
13.595

0.035
0.675
0.034
0.614

0.413
0.145
0.189
0.425

CI7098
PCTFDI7098
FDIPC7098

ABSLAT DEM ALLFEDDEM FEDDEM
ABSLAT DEM ALLFEDDEM FEDDEM
ABSLAT DEM ALLFEDDEM FEDDEM

FEDDEM
FEDDEM
FEDDEM

(1.165)
0.181
31.016

0.649
0.429
0.311

0.415
0.153
0.434
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Table 6:

Dependent Variable

Independent Variables

Variable of
Interest (VoI)

Coefficient
of VoI

P > |t|

R-squared

0.939
0.716
0.403
0.327

0.102
0.046
0.055
0.057

All Democracies Dropped (FEDDICT AND UNTDICT LEFT)
CI7098
PCTFDI7098
FDINET7098
FDIPC7098

ABSLAT
ABSLAT
ABSLAT
ABSLAT

FEDDICT
FEDDICT
FEDDICT
FEDDICT

FEDDICT
FEDDICT
FEDDICT
FEDDICT

(0.227)
0.061
(0.196)
7.491

All Dictatorships Dropped (FEDDEM , ADM FEDDEM, AND UNTDEM LEFT)
CI7098
PCTFDI7098
FDINET7098
FDIPC7098

ABSLAT FEDDEM
ABSLAT FEDDEM
ABSLAT FEDDEM
ABSLAT FEDDEM

FEDDEM
FEDDEM
FEDDEM
FEDDEM

1.807
0.104
0.048
33.022

0.289
0.623
0.834
0.292

0.461
0.128
0.175
0.395

Dependent Variable

Independent Variables

Variable of
Interest (VoI)

Coefficient
of VoI

P > |t|

R-squared

HJGADP

ABSLAT FEDDEM

FEDDEM

0.127

0.003

0.630

HJGADP
HJGADP

ABSLAT FEDDEM DEM
ABSLAT FEDDEM DEM

FEDDEM
DEM

0.075
0.101

0.088
0.008

0.667
0.667

CI7098
PCTFDI7098
FDINET7098
FDIPC7098

ABSLAT HJGADP
ABSLAT HJGADP
ABSLAT HJGADP
ABSLAT HJGADP

HJGADP
HJGADP
HJGADP
HJGADP

23.234
1.874
0.251
303.116

0.000
0.000
0.665
0.000

0.498
0.273
0.131
0.527

Table 7:

The first part of Table 5 shows that being a democracy is correlated with higher
levels of total investment and FDI inflows. For this type of analysis, an R2 of over 0.300
is reasonable and we achieve values beyond that threshold for CI7098 and for
FDIPC7098. The most relevant dependent variable is PCTFDI7098 and we see that the
coefficient of DEM in this regression is 0.295%. Thus, this regression tells us that being a
democracy increase FDI inflows to a country by 0.295% of GDP.
The second part of Table 5 seeks to understand the additive effective of being a
federal democracy once a country is already a democracy. Thus, it seeks to answer the
question: How does adding federalism on an existing democracy impact FDI? Looking at
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all four regressions, the results show that there is no statistically significant impact of
federalism on FDI once a country is a democracy. The third part of Table 5 answers
essentially the same question as the second part; the difference is that it includes
administratively federal democracies along with federal democracies. An administrative
federal democracy is essentially “de facto” federal. The exact methodology to determine
what makes it “de facto” federal is based on the percentage of total government revenues
coming from local governments. The data indicates that being either type of federal, “de
facto” or constitutionally federal does improve upon total investment. Furthermore, it
indicates that countries that can be classified in ALLFEDDEM tend to be exporters rather
than importers of capital. This makes sense considering our intuition that countries such
as the United States, Australia, and Germany tend to be capital exporters rather than
importers. Nonetheless, this regression fails to tell us what we thought we would hear;
Federalism seems not to help attract FDI inflows for an existing democracy.
Part four looks at whether or not being specifically federal (constitutionally as
opposed to “de facto”) impacts FDI in any way. There is no statistically significant
difference between the two.
Table 6 attempts to isolate the effects of federalism from democracy. The idea is
that even if we do not see federalism improving upon democracy in the overall data,
perhaps adding federal structures (i.e. policy decentralization and the other criterion from
Weingast’s analysis) helps non-democracies (i.e. dictatorships). Surprisingly, adding
policy decentralization to a non-democracy does nothing to help any of our dependent
variables! This result helps us to understand the essential role of democracy in attracting
FDI and total investment. A similar attempt to isolate the effects of federalism is
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presented in part 2 of Table 6. The data shows that once you consider all democracies,
being federal in addition to being democratic does not help you attract FDI.
Finally, Table 7 studies the effects of the variable HJGADP, which quantifies the
economic rights of a country. This part of the analysis is where we see a lot of interesting
and exciting results. The first part of the table shows that federalism positively impacts
HJGADP (this is a similar result to Inman’s) and with an R2 = 0.630, we can be confident
that this regression explains federalism’s impact of HJGADP well. Secondly, we learn
that being a democracy plays, like being federal, plays a key role in determining a
countries economic rights. Democracy actually plays a more important role than
federalism, since it has a coefficient of 0.101 (on a 0-1 Scale variable) and federalism has
a 0.075 coefficient.
The last part of Table 7 explains a lot about our dependent variables. It indicates
that HJGADP is very important in determining CI7098, PCTFDI7098, and FDIPC7098.
It has a coefficient of 23.234 when regressed on CI7098 (mean = 18.699), 1.874 on
PCTFDI7098 (mean = 0.617), and 303.116 on FDIPC7098 (mean = 62.754). HJGADP
has quite a large impact!

Conclusion
Before reaching conclusions based on the simple statistics used in this study, it is
important to acknowledge that numerous other factors can impact the dependent
variables. These can include a country’s legal origins, culture, goals, development stage,
etc. Our research does not account for not explain the implications of all of these other
possible factors, as such a comprehensive analysis is far beyond the scope and objective
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of this paper. The conclusions drawn here ignore these other effects and leave the
understanding

of

the

other

variables

up

to

future

studies.

As discussed in the literature review, a MNC’s decision to invest in a particular
foreign country depends heavily on the level of political risk present in that nation. We
expected that both democracy and federalism (although federalism was the primary focus
of this study) would lower the political risk of a country and thereby attract higher levels
of investment (both total and FDI inflows). (1) The first conclusion we can draw from the
results is that democracy certainly does impact our dependent variables; it’s coefficient
on total investment (CI7098) is 2.698 (mean = 18.699), on FDI inflows as a percentage of
GDP (PCTFDI7098) is 0.295 (mean = 0.617), and on FDI per capita (FDIPC7098) is
56.289 (mean = 62.754). Thus, democracy seems to lower a government’s political risk
and this in turn encourages FDI inflows.
(2) The second conclusion, which contradicts our intuition and expectations from
the theoretical literature, is the federalism does not add much to democracy in terms of
lowering political risk more to attract even higher levels of FDI inflows. This result is
consistent with Jensen and McGillvray’s findings. They find the following:
The additive effective of combining federalism and democracy … is small. As we
suspected, democratic countries are already regarded as trustworthy, so the
additional credibility provided by federalism has little effect on FDI.26
We find the same result, which is evident from the regression summaries in Table 5.
(3) The third conclusion we draw is that federalism does not help nondemocratic
countries attract higher levels of FDI. This result can be seen from the regression

26

Jensen, Nathan and McGillivray, Fiona. “Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism,
Government Credibility, and Foreign Direct Investment,” International Interactions 31, 303-325.
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summaries in Table 6. This result contradicts the findings of Jensen and McGillvray, who
found that “federalism has a strong effect on the integrity of nondemocratic countries”.27
Our results show that democracy matters most and that federalism without democracy
does not do anything to increase investor confidence. This is not entirely surprising based
on Weingast’s work. (F2), one of the criteria for being federal, states that “the autonomy
of each government [must be] institutionalized in a manner that makes federalism’s
restrictions self-enforcing”. It seems natural to assume that democracy provides the
structure to make these restrictions self-enforcing. Without democracy, the federal
structures do not hold as much weight; thus, investors do not have the confidence in these
nondemocractic federal nations as they do in democratic countries.
It seems at odds with the theoretical literature that federalism has absolutely no
impact on FDI inflows (via political risk) above and beyond the impact of democracy. Is
our analysis and application of Weingast, Inman, etc. incorrect? This may not necessarily
be the case. Table 7, in which we introduce HJGADP may provide some explanation as
to what federalism does contribute above and beyond democracy. See Figure A, which is
a short version of one created by Inman, and changed slightly to make it relevant to this
study:28
Figure A shows that both democracy and federalism contribute to economic rights
(HJGADP). Then economic rights contribute to the dependent variables we studied (FDI
inflows importantly). (4) The fourth conclusion is that this impact on economic rights is
federalism’s unique contribution toward attraction of FDI above and beyond what
democracy alone can do. Federalism enhances those property rights that lower the
27
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political risk of a country and thereby attract FDI. Although this manner of looking at the
situation provides some insight, it also adds confusion. Presumably, we should see this
effect directly; federalism should directly impact FDI as well by transitivity. Despite
effort, the author is unable to untangle the effects and understand why one impact is
present and the other is not. Plausibly, if economic rights consist of a variety of factors,
federalism contributes to those factors that have less to do with FDI than democracy
does. This is speculative however and does not sufficiently satisfy the confusion. We
leave the untangling of this confusion to future research.
Ultimately, this paper finds that if a country wants to attract FDI, regardless of the
merits of the arguments claiming that it promotes economic growth, it needs to become a
democracy. Becoming a democracy makes the country a safer place to invest for MNCs
because it lowers the political risks of nationalization and the enactment of unfavorable
legislation. Additionally, going one step further and becoming a federalist democracy
(either constitutionally or “de facto”, the study finds no statistically significant difference
between the two) will help increase its economic rights and these in turn will attract FDI.
Thus the empirical analysis seems to validate the theoretical research, but some
surprising results do emerge.
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Federal Constitution

Figure A

DEMocracy

DEMocratic FEDeralism

N
0.007
(0.001)*

0.22
(0.05)*

R
0.03
(0.04)

LOCal REVenue
0.40
(0.14)*
Economic (HJGADP) Rights

23.23
(0.00)*
CI7098

1.87
(0.00)*
PCTFDI7098

303.12
(0.00)*
FDIPC7098

Note: * Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level or higher.
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